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1.  INTRODUCTION
Many public key cryptosystems are designed based on the 
hardness of discrete logarithm problem (DLP) or computational 
diffie-hellman problem (CDHP). Vector decomposition problem 
(VDP), initially proposed by Yoshida1,2, was introduced as 
an alternative to these problems. Yoshida provided some 
sufficient conditions for the equivalence of VDP and CDHP. 
Duursma and Kiyavash3 proved that genus 1 curves satisfying 
these conditions are supersingular. Supersingular curves are 
not preferred for the use of VDP due to the existence of MOV 
- reduction or FR - reduction. Hence higher genus curves are 
preferred for the use of VDP. Okamoto7, et al. extended the idea 
of VDP into higher dimensional vector spaces. They introduced 
a homomorphic encryption and signature scheme using dual 
pairing vector spaces and a trapdoor function. Lim6, et al. 
introduced key substitution attack on Okamoto and Takashima 
scheme7. We make use of the hardness of VDP, curves given 
in papers3,7,8, the trapdoor given by Okamoto and Takashima7 
and a similar protocol given by So9, et al. to construct an 
authenticated key agreement scheme and also prove that key 
substitution attack6 is not possible in our scheme.
Certificateless public key cryptography was introduced by 
Al-Riyami and Paterson10. They introduced a key generating 
center (KGC) and shown that the trust required on KGC is 
much less than that required on private key generator (PKG) in 
identity based public key cryptography and certifying authority 
(CA) in traditional certificate based schemes. But the protocol 
lacks the resistance towards leakage of ephemeral keys11. 
Though Swanson and Jao11 suggests that the problem can be 
fixed, they also claim that this fix is not strong. Mandt and 
Tan12 proposed a protocol that satisfy all the security properties 
of Al-Riyami and Paterson protocol. But Swanson and Jao11 
proved that Mandit and Tan12 protocol is not resistant towards 
the leakage of ephemeral information and also shown that 
Mandt and Tan protocol admits key compromise impersonation 
(KCI) attack. In all these schemes KGC can launch a man-
in-middle attack. Lippod13, et.al. proposed a scheme which 
is provably secure in a suitable security model, extended 
Carnetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model11. The scheme is secure under 
bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, but requires ten pairing 
computations per party. The number of pairing computations 
can be reduced to five pairings per party under gap bilinear 
Diffie-Hellman assumption.
We propose a scheme similar to Al-Riyami and Paterson10. 
The security of our scheme is depending on the hardness of 
vector decomposition problem (VDP). In our scheme KGC 
used in paper10 is the master authority which also acts similar 
to private key generator (PKG) in the identity based encryption 
scheme by Boneh and Franklin14. But in each session of our 
scheme, entity chooses a new random number to establish the 
session key. Though PKG knows the private key, the presence 
of the random number makes this key as a partial private key 
and solves key escrow problem in identity based cryptography. 
The users are required to register with the master authority, 
PKG initially. PKG generates its own secret key, say, master 
secret key. By using this master key, secret keys are provided 
to users who register with it. The amount of trust invested 
on PKG in the proposed scheme is less than that required in 
Al-Riyami and Patterson, but our scheme requires a trusted 
directory of public keys. The knowledge of full secret key 
of the user will give negligible advantage to PKG. This is 
explained in detail in the later section. Hence we do not require 
the double encryption used in certificateless cryptographic 
schemes. Registration is a one time process. Once the 
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registration is successfully over, these registered users can 
communicate among themselves without contacting the PKG 
again. This reduces the key exchange traffic. our scheme does 
not require digital certificates for authentication and thus solves 
the problem of managing too many digital certificates. Three 
points on an elliptic curve are used as public key and another 
point as private key and hence public and private keys are 
short. Moreover, our scheme requires no pairing computation 
during encryption and requires only six pairing computation 
during decryption. The scheme has both forward secrecy and 
backward secrecy. To provide freshness to the session key,  we 
use a hybrid method suggested by Mitchell15. Our proposed 
scheme permits the user to choose the five random numbers 
out of six random numbers used for encryption (The remaining 
one is dependant on two of these five random numbers). The 
initiator can make use of one of the numbers as a counter based 
on real time. This provides freshness to the key and prevents 
replay attack. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
A bilinear map is a function 1 2 3:e G G G× →  where 
1 2 3, ,G G G  are groups of finite order. The function e(. , .) is such 
that for all u ∈G 1 , v ∈G 2 , e(ua,vb)=e(u,v)ab where a and b are 
integers.
Definition 2.1 A bilinear pairing on ( , )G G′  is an 
efficiently computable map : : ,G G G′φ × →  which is bilinear 
and non-degenerate where ,G G′  are groups of finite order.
ie, for all , , ,a b c G∈
( , ) = ( , ) ( , )a b c a c b cφ + φ φ                                              (1)
( , ) = ( , ) ( , )a b c a b a cφ + φ φ                                              (2)
( , ) 1a bφ ≠ , =a b/∀                                                         (3)
2.1 Vector Decomposition Problem 
Okamoto and Takashima7 introduced VDP in higher 
dimensions and the concept of dual pairing vector spaces. The 
higher dimensional VDP is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 Generalised Computational Vector 
Decomposition Problem (gCVDP): Let V be a vector space 
over the field Fp and 1 2{ , ,.., }nP P P  be a basis for V.  For a given Q V∈ , VDP with respect to the basis 1 2{ , ,.., }nP P P  is to 
compute the element R V∈  such that 1 2< , ,.., >mR P P P∈  and 
1< ,.., >m nQ R P P+− ∈ , m < n.
Let Nλ ∈  be the security parameter of a set up algorithm 
that outputs a n − dimensional Fp- vector space V, m < n and A 
be a probabilistic polynomial time machine. 
Let 
=1
= ,n i iiv x P∑  where 1 2, ,.., nP P P V∈  and 
1 2, ,.., .n px x x F∈  The ( , ) ( )m ngCVDP λ  advantage of A is 
the probability of getting
= 1
= n i ii mw x P+ ′∑   where V and 
1 2( , ,.., )nP P P  are given.
The gCVDP assumption is that for any polynomial time 
adversary A, the advantage ( , ) ( )m ngCVDP λ  is negligible7.
Definition 2.3 Generalised computational diffie hellman 
problem (gCDHP): Let V be a n − dimensional vector space 
over the field Fp. Let 1 2, ,..,m m nP P P+ + , 1 2, ,..,m m nP P P V+ +′ ′ ′∈
,where m < n. Consider the vectors = 1=
n
i ii m
v x P
+∑  and
= 1
= n i ii mw x P+ ′∑ , where 1 2, ,.., .n px x x ∈F  
Given , , ,i iv P P′ i=m+1,…,n as above, gCDHP  is to find 
w .
Let A be a probabilistic polynomial time machine. The 
( , ) ( )m ngCDHP λ  advantage of A  is the probability of getting 
= 1
= n i ii mw x P+ ′∑  where V, 1 2( , ,.., )nP P P  and = 1=
n
i ii m
v x P
+∑  are 
given. 
The gCDHP assumption is that given any polynomial 
time adversary A, the ( , ) ( )m ngCDHP λ  advantage of A is 
negligible7.
2.2 Trapdoor for VDP 
For constructing a trapdoor for solving VDP in higher 
dimension, Okamoto and Takashima7 introduced the concept 
called distortion eigenvector space for higher dimension. This 
vector space has efficiently computable distortion maps and 
bilinear operators. 
Definition 2.4 Distortion eigenvector space V is a n
-dimensional vector space over F,  that satisfies the following 
conditions:  
1. There exist A, F and , 1 ,{ }i j i j n≤ ≤ϕ  such that: Let 
1 2= ( , ,.., )nA Q Q Q  be a basis of Fr -vector space V and 
F  a polynomial-time computable automorphism on V. 
The basis A is called a distortion eigenvector basis with 
respect to F, if each iQ  is an eigenvector of F, their 
eigenvalues are different from each other, and there exist 
polynomial-time computable endomorphisms ,i jϕ  of V 
such that , ( ) =i j j iQ Qϕ . We call ,i jϕ  a distortion map.
2. There exists a skew-symmetric non-degenerate bilinear 
pairing : re V V× → µ  where rµ  is a multiplicative cyclic 
group of order r .
3. There exists a polynomial-time computable automorphism 
ρ  on V  such that ( , ( )) = 1e v v /ρ  for any v  except for v  in a 
quadratic hypersurface of ( )nrV F≅ .
Lemma 1 (Projection Operators).Let 1 2= ( , ,.., )nA Q Q Q  
be a distortion eigenvector basis of V, and iQ  has its eigenvalue 
iλ  of F . The following polynomial of F  is a projection 
operator: 1= =( ) = ( ( )) ( )( )j i j j i i j iPr v F v
−
/ /Π λ − λ Π − λ .
Hence ( ) = 0j kPr Q  for =k j/  and ( ) =j j jPr Q Q .
Let V  be a distortion eigenvector space and 1 2( , ,.., )nQ Q Q  
be a distortion eigen basis of V.  Consider the matrix = ( )ijX x  
such that =1=
n
i ij jj
P x a∑  and 1 2( , ,.., )nP P P  is also a basis for V. 
Let 
=1
= n i iiv y P∑  be the vector in V. Our aim is to decompose 
v  as the sum of two vectors where one lies in the subspace 
generated by 1 2( , ,.., )mP P P , m < n and the other lies in the 
subspace generated by 1 2( , ,.., )nP P P . If 1 = ( )ijX t
− , lemma 3 
of Okamoto and Takashima7 proves the function
1 2 =1 =1
( ,< >, ,< , ,.., >) = ( ( ))n nj n ij jk ki ii kVDeco v P X P P P t x Pr vϕ∑ ∑
can be used to accomplish this goal.
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3. OKAMOTO TAKASHIMA SCHEME AND KEY 
SUBSTITUTION ATTACKS
3.1 Public Keys in Okamoto and Takashima 
Scheme
Let V be a distortion eigenvector space and :F V V→  
be an endomorphism. Let 1 2= ( , ,.., )nA Q Q Q  be a distortion 
eigenvector basis for V. Therefore, there exist 1λ , 2λ ,..., nλ  
such that 1 1 1( ) =F Q Qλ , 2 2 2( ) =F Q Qλ ,..., ( ) =n n nF Q Qλ .  Let 
ijϕ  be the distortion map such that ( ) =ij j iQ Qϕ .  = ( )ijX u  
is a matrix where ij pu F∈  such that det = 0X / . 1P , 2P ,.., nP  
are points generated by X  such that 1 2= ( , ,.., )
T
j nP X Q Q Q . Let
1 2= { , ,.., }nB P P P . Hence B also forms a basis. Here ( , , )V A B  
is the public parameter. 
3.2 Equivalent Public Keys and Key Substitution 
Attack
In key substitution attack, a malicious adversary generates 
an alternate public key corresponding to the public key of an 
authorised user. Let pk  and σ  be the public key and signature 
of the authorised user for a given message. The adversary D 
tries to find an alternate public key pk ′  and a signature ′σ  
corresponding to the parameters pk  and σ  of the user for the 
given message. That is, for a given message m , ′σ  is also a 
valid signature with respect to the new public key (= )pk pk′ / . 
To perform the attack, if the adversary does not require the 
secret key sk ′ , corresponding to the new public key pk ′ , it 
is called strong key substitution(SKS) attack, otherwise weak 
key substitution attack. Lim et.al.6 showed the following 
Signature-equivalent public keys and encryption-equivalent 
public keys existing in the Okamoto and Takashima scheme7 
and demonstrated a SKS attack.
3.2.1 Signature-equivalent Public Keys
Definition 3.1 For two key pairs ( , )pk sk  and ( , )pk sk′ ′  in 
a signature scheme, the public key pk ′  is signature-equivalent 
to the public key pk  if ( , , ( , )) =Verify pk m Sign sk m True′  for 
any message m .
Let the public parameters of the Okamoto and Takashima 
signature schemes are ( , , , )V A B h  with 1 2= ( , ,.. )nB P P P  and 
a hash function .h Then ( , , , )V A B h′  with 1 2= ( , ,.. )nB P P P′ ′ ′ ′  
such that ( , ) = 1j je P P′  for = 1,2,..,j n  forms the signature-
equivalent public keys6.
3.2.2 Encryption-equivalent Public Keys  
Definition 3.2 For two key pairs ( , )pk sk  and ( , )pk sk′ ′  in an 
encryption scheme, the public key pk ′  is encryption-equivalent 
to the public key pk  if ( , ( , )) =Decrypt sk Encrypt pk m m′  for 
any message m.  
The following encryption-equivalent public keys exist 
in the Okamoto and Takashima scheme. Let = ( , , )pk V A B  
with 1 2= ( , ,.. )nB P P P . Then = ( , , )pk V A B′ ′  forms the set of 
equivalent keys with 1 2= ( , ,.. )nB P P P′ ′ ′ ′  where
1
1
,
=
, .
n
i ik k
k m
i n
ik k
k m
P z P if i m
P
z P otherwise
= +
= +
 + ≤′ 


∑
∑
4. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATED KEY 
AGREEMENT SCHEME
We propose an authenticated key agreement scheme 
using vector decomposition. The trapdoor function described 
in Section 2.2 is used for decryption and authentication in 
the proposed scheme. Let / pE F  be a hyper elliptic curve 
and :F E E→  be an endomorphism. Let = ( , , )A S T U  
be a distortion eigen basis for [ ]E m , the set of m–torsion 
points on E for a prime m. Therefore, there exist 1λ , 2λ  and 
3λ  such that 1( ) =F S Sλ , 2( ) =F T Tλ  and 3( ) = .F U Uλ  If 
1 2 3= , = , =b S b T b U , then ijϕ  be the distortion map such that 
( ) =ij j ib bϕ . Let = ( )ijX u  be a matrix where ij pu F∈  and 
det = 0X / . 
Let 1 2 3= { , , }B P P P , where 1P , 2P  and 3P  are points 
generated by X such that : 
1 11 12 13=P u S u T u U+ + , 2 21 22 23=P u S u T u U+ +  and 
3 31 32 33=P u S u T u U+ + . 
Hence B also forms a basis which is not a distortion 
eigenvector basis. Here the public parameters are / pE F ,
1 2 3( , , )P P P , ( , , ).S T U  The transformation matrix X is kept as 
secret.
The proposed key agreement scheme could be 
implemented in networks. Our scheme consists of two phases. 
The device registration with private key generator (PKG) is 
performed in phase-I. Once the registration is successfully 
over, phase-II which contains data packet transmission and 
reception begins.
Master Key Device Registration:  
• The PKG selects a distortion eigenvector basis, the 
transformation matrix = ( )KG ijX u  and generates 
1 2 3( , , )P P P ,  as above. PKG selects a random number z 
which is the master secret key.
 A device Alice in the network want to register herself with 
PKG:
• There will be two device registration keys, namely 
DS R  and DA R  such that = ,D DS R zA R embedded in the 
device.
• Alice selects a distortion eigenvector basis, its 
transformation matrix = ( )A ijX v  and generates 
( , , )r sA A A as above.
• Alice chooses a random number ar  and calculate 
1 2 3=G D D aK S RP A RP r P+ + . She sends a request to PKG 
along with GK .
• on receiving the GK , PKG uses 
1 1 2 3( ,< >, , ( , , ))G KGVDeco K P X P P P  to get 1DS RP  and 
2 1 2 3( ,< >, , ( , , ))G KGVDeco K P X P P P  to get 2DA RP . 
• PKG verifies 1DS RP  and 2DA RP  and if it matches with that 
of Alice, PKG calculates Alice’s secret key as =ASk zA  
and encrypts zA  as = D r D sK zA S RA A RA+ + . PKG sends 
K to Alice.
• on receiving K , Alice uses 
( ,< >, , ( , , ))A r sVDeco K A X A A A  and retrieves the secret 
key zA. 
• Alice confirms the originality by verifying whether 
= ( ,< >, , ( , , ))D r r A r sS RA VDeco K A X A A A  and
= ( ,< >, , ( , , ))D s s A r sA RA VDeco K A X A A A .  
Any mismatch of the two equations will abort the process. 
PRAVEEN, et al.: An AuTHenTiCATeD Key AGReeMenT SCHeMe uSinG VeCToR DeCoMPoSiTion
597
She uses this secret key for establishing any session key 
in the network. Once this registration is successfully over, 
Alice can communicate with any other registered device in the 
network using this scheme.
Data Packet Transmission:
Alice performs the following procedure for the key 
establishment and authentication.  
• Choose the public keys of Bob , ,r sB B B . 
• Select random elements 1 2 3 1 2 3, , , , ,k k k d d d  such that 
1 1 2 3= A r sk B d Sk d A d A+ +  and fixes the X-coordinate of 
1k B , say u, as the session key. 
• Calculate 1 2 3=c r sB k B k B k B+ + . 
• let 1 1=d zA t , 2 2=rd A t  and 1 1 3=d k A t . 
• Alice sends 1 2 3( , , , )cB t t t  to Bob. 
Data Packet Reception:
on receiving the packet, Bob performs decryption and 
verifies the genuineness of the source using the following 
procedure.  
• Calculate 1k B using ( ,< >, , ( , , ))c B r sVDeco B B X B B B . 
• Find u , the X-coordinate of 1k B . 
• Verify the originality using Weil Pairing,
1 1 3( , ) = ( , )Be t k B e t Sk                                                      (1)
1 2 1( , ) = ( , )s se t t A e k B A+    (2)
1 3 1 2 3( , ) = ( , )s se k B t A e t t t A+ + +    (3)
• if the above check fails, terminate and restart the 
procedure.
4.1 Correctness of the Scheme
Proposition 4.1  The above scheme provides both 
confidentiality and authentication. 
Proof:
Confidentiality: Extracting 1k B  from CB  is equivalent to 
solve VDP.
Authentication: The scheme provides entity 
authentication.
To extract 1d  and z  from 1 1=t d zA , one should solve 
ECDLP and then apply integer factorization. 
Since 1 1 2 3= r sK B d zA d A d A+ + , it can also be done using 
the trapdoor function 1( ,< >, , ( , , ))A r sVDeco K B A X A A A . 
Hence only Alice can perform this extraction. 
Note that here 1t  is the component of cB  which is equal to 
1 Ad Sk . Hence Alice computes 1 Ad Sk  without applying VDeco . 
in the verification process,
lHS and RHS of eqn (1) simplifies to 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) = ( , ) = ( , ) = ( , )
d zk
Ae t k B e d Sk k B e d zA k B e A B
and 1 13 1 1( , ) = ( , ) = ( , )
d k z
Be t Sk e d k A zB e A B  respectively.
Since Weil pairing is alternating, ( , ) = 1.s se A A  
Hence lHS and RHS of eqn. (2) simplifies to :
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2
( , ) = ( , ). ( , ) = ( , ). ( , )
= ( , ). ( , ) = ( , ) . ( , )
s s s A s r s
d z d
s r s s r s
e t t A e t A e t A e d Sk A e d A A
e d zA A e d A A e A A e A A
+  
and
1 1 2 3
1 2
1 2 3
( , ) = ( , )
= ( , ) = ( , ) . ( , ) ,
s A r s s
d z d
r s s s r s
e k B A e d Sk d A d A A
e d zA d A d A A e A A e A A
+ +
+ +
respectively.
RHS of (3) can be simplified as 
1 2 3 1 3 3
3
1 3 1 3
( , ) = ( , )
= ( , ). ( , ) = ( , )
s s s
d
s s s s
e t t t A e k B d A t A
e K B t A e A A e k B t A−
+ + − +
+ +
which is the lHS of (3).            
4.2 Comparison with Okamoto and Takashima 
Scheme
The primary aim of Okamoto and Takashima encryption 
scheme was to construct a two party protocol to securely 
evaluate a 2DnF formula over n  variables. In their scheme7, 
the decryption requires the computation of eCDlP. Hence 
in Okamoto and Takashima encryption scheme, the message 
is selected from a logarithmically small space. The proposed 
scheme requires six pairing computations whereas okamoto 
and Takashima scheme requires four pairing computations. 
The security of both schemes are based on the hardness 
of VDP. But the complexity of message extraction after 
performing vector decomposition in Okamoto and Takashima 
scheme is exponential (unless the message is selected from a 
logarithmically small space). Since our scheme requires only 
1k B  (and not 1k  ), the key establishment is accomplished by 
the decomposition of cB  which can be done in polynomial 
time. Hence the computational complexity of our scheme is 
less than that of Okamoto and Takashima scheme. 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Security of our scheme is based on the hardness of vector 
decomposition problem and elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem (eCDlP). Since the curve used satisfies yoshida 
conditions1, VDP is atleast as hard as CDHP and even after 
MOV - reduction  DlP is hard on these curves. Hence the 
scheme is secure. Theorem1 by Okamoto and Takashima7 
compares the hardness of gCVDP and gCDHP 
 Although most of the schemes can agree on general 
definitions, their ideas diverge when precision is required and 
all attacks must be considered relative to the protocol goals16. 
We consider two types of adversaries as explained by Al-Riyami 
and Paterson10 and Swanson and Jao11. Type-I adversary or 
outside adversary is one who can replace the public key of the 
user, but does not have access to the master secret key. If the 
adversary make ReplacePublicKey command, alteration will be 
made in the public parameters of party B . In Section 5.2 and 
proposition 5.1 in Section 5.1, we shown that the advantage 
of such adversary is negligible. Type-II adversary or inside 
adversary has the access to master secret key but cannot alter 
the public keys. Any adversary who knows the master key used 
in the scheme or the partial private key used in some session, 
gets negligible advantage. This is because extracting 1K B  
from cB  requires solving VDP, and hence only the receiver 
can compute 1 1( , )e t K B . 
So if 1 1 3( , ) ( , )Be t K B e t Sk≠ , the receiver can realize that it 
has not been sent by Alice. 
5.1 Key Substitution Attack
Proposition 5.1  Let , ,r sB B B′ ′ ′  be the public keyss such 
that, for random ijc  with , = 1,2,3i j ,
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12 13= r sB B c B c B′ + + , 22 23=r r sB c B c B′ + , 
23 33=s r sB c B c B′ + .
Then , ,r sB B B′ ′ ′  can not be used to decrypt the ciphertext 
encrypted using , ,r sB B B  in the proposed scheme.
Proof: The encryption in the proposed scheme gives 
1 2 3=c r sB k B k B k B+ +  where , ,r sB B B  are the encryption-
equivalent public keys of Bob. Consider the ciphertext 
1 2 3=c r sB k B k B k B′ ′ ′ ′+ + , obtained using encryption-equivalent 
public keys , ,r sB B B′ ′ ′ .
1 2 3 1 12 13
2 22 23 3 23 33
= = ( )
( ) ( )
c r s r s
r s r s
B k B k B k B k B c B c B
k c B c B k c B c B
′ ′ ′ ′+ + + +
+ + + +
1 1 12 2 22 3 32 1 13 2 23 3 33= ( ) ( )r sk B k c k c k c B k c k c k c B+ + + + + +
Let X ′  be the trapdoor corresponding to , ,r sB B B′ ′ ′ .
Then 1( ,< >, , ( , , )) =C r sVDeco B B X B B B k B′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′  and 
1( ,< >, , ( , , )) =C r sVDeco B B X B B B k B′ .
Let the x-coordinate of 1k B  and 1k B′  be u  and u′  
respectively. Then =u u′/ .
Proposition 5.2 Let , ,r sA A A′ ′ ′  be the public keys such that 
( , ) = 1e A A′ , ( , ) = 1r re A A′  and ( , ) = 1s se A A′ . Then , ,r sA A A  
does not act as signature-equivalent public keys in the proposed 
scheme.
Proof: When the signature is verified, the first equation 
gives, 1 11 1 3( , ) = ( , ) = ( , )
d k ze t k B e t zB e A B .
Extracting 1k B  from CB  is equivalent to solve VDP. 
Since , ,r sB B B′ ′ ′  are the encryption-equivalent public keys, 
the attacker is able to find 1k B′ . The complexity of finding 
1k B  using 1k B′  is equivalent to the complexity of solving 
DLP. Since the curves are chosen in such a way that MOV -
reduction  is not applicable, finding 1k B  is a hard problem. 
even if the attacker finds 1d zA′  and 1 ,k B the signature 
verification gives :  
1 1 1 1
1 1( , ) = ( , ) = ( , )
d k z d k ze d zA k B e A B e A B′ ′ / .        
5.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
Man-in-middle attack can succeed only when an attacker 
can impersonate, hence exposing pairing operations to 
terminate. If an adversary D want to disrupt the communication, 
one method is to multiply every element of the packet sent 
by the sender by some random number, say y. Then the tuple 
becomes 1 2 3( , , , )cyB yt yt yt .
Then eqn.(1) will disagree, since 
2
1 1
1 1( , ) = ( , )
y d zke yt yk B e A B  
and 1 13( , ) = ( , )
yd k z
Be yt Sk e A B . Hence the key agreement scheme 
process is abandoned.
If the adversary keeps the tuple 1 2 3( , , , )cyB t yt yt  so as to 
satisfy eqn. (1), then there will be conflict while verifying eqn. 
(2).
lHS of eqn. (2) simplifies to 
1 2 1 2( , ) = ( , ) ( , )s s se t yt A e t A e yt A+ 1 2= ( , ) ( , )
d z d y
s r se A A e A A
But RHS of (2) simplifies to 
1 2
1 2 3( , ) = ( , ) ( , )
yd z d y
A r s s s r se yd Sk yd A yd A A e A A e A A+ +
Hence the key agreement process is abandoned.
If the adversary keeps the tuple 21 2 3( , , , )cyB t yt y t , so as to 
satisfy eqn. (1), the eqn. (3) is not satisfied and any alteration 
in t2  will affect the eqn. (2) in the verification process.
In all these cases the process is aborted. So change in any 
of the elements in the packet 1 2 3( , , , )cB t t t , sent by the user will 
make the process abandoned. Hence the scheme is resistant 
towards man-in-middle attack. 
5.3 Forward Security
If any adversary is not able to realise any of the previously 
established keys on compromise of a long term secret key of 
any user, then the scheme is called forward secure. Extracting 
k1B from Bc  is equivalent to solve VDP with respect to the 
basis (B, Br, Bs). Since k1  and k2  are random, Bc is random 
for each session. The elements of Fp  are uniformly distributed 
and k1,k2 are selected with a probability close to zero. Hence 
the advantage of the adversary is negligible. Long term secret 
keys zA or zB will not give any advantage to the adversary to 
compromise the previous session keys. 
5.4 Unknown Key Share Attack
This attack is possible if any two devices in the network 
use the same public key, say, B. If an adversary registers with 
the master authority using the public key of an existing user, 
say Alice, then the secret keys of adversary and Alice will be 
zB. 
Since 1 2 3= ,c r sB k B k B k B+ +  knowing zB  or zA  will 
not give any advantage in decomposing cB  or altering the 
equations used for security check. 
6. CONCLUSION
network infrastructure requires security at an optimized 
cost without losing the speed of communication. This 
necessitates the introduction of authenticated key agreement 
schemes. A solution based on vector decomposition problem 
is suggested in this paper. Our scheme is a homomorphic 
encryption scheme which is simple and secure even with short 
ciphertexts. Our scheme has lower computational complexity 
while maintaining the same security of Okamoto and 
Takashima5 scheme. We also showed that the key substitution 
attack by Lim6, et.al. is not possible in this scheme. Further, 
this scheme can be extended to a multiparty key agreement 
scheme.
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